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Disenrollment Patterns of Elderly in Managed Care 
and Fee for Service 
Kenneth G. Manton,* H. Dennis Tolley,t Robert Newcomer,* 
James C. Vertrees,§ and Charlene Harrington~ 
Abstract 
As the trend to provide health care through managed care facilities in-
creases, the need to examine ,vhy insured individuals voluntarily terminate 
managed care coverage grows. Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enroll-
ment, has both social and fiscal implications. Particularly among the elderly, 
patterns of disenrollment likely are related to self assessment of care needs 
and levels of health. In this paper we examine the patterns of dis enrollment 
among elderly enrollees as a function of health status and disability. We focus 
on disenrollment patterns from an experimental prepaid extended care facil-
ity, called a social HMO (S/HMO) and compare this pattern with dis enrollment 
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within a sample of HMO enrollees and with a fee for service sample. The anal-
ysis is based on a frailty index defined using a fuzzy set model. The results 
indicate that bias in the enrollment process is exacerbated by disenrollment 
patterns that depend on the level of frailty and disability. Those with a greater 
degree of disability and chronic illness tend to disenroll into the fee for service 
coverage. Healthier persons, on the other hand, have a lower likelihood of dis-
enrollment. This suggests that managed care is not providing for the needs of 
the patients most in need of care. 
Key words and phrases: fuzzy set, health care, health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO), Medicare 
1 Introduction 
This paper presents an analysis of patterns of voluntary termination 
of coverage among individuals enrolled in an experimental managed 
care environment and compares these patterns with those enrolled in 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and those covered under fee 
for service (FFS). Voluntary termination of coverage, or dis enrollment, 
can result in fortuitous gains or unexpected losses if those disenrolling 
are more or less healthy and/or disabled than the average of those cov-
ered. Differential likelihood of dis enrollment for individuals with dif-
fering levels of disability and health care need is considered a prime 
cause of deterioration in the claims experience for individual and small 
group coverages. The effects of differential dis enrollment among the 
enrollees of a managed care provider also can be significant. Although 
methods of formally recognizing and reserving for differential dis en-
rollment are not widespread, the trends toward increasing the role of 
managed care makes understanding the effects of dis enrollment on the 
profile of the enrollees essential. 
It has been proposed that a major cause of dis enrollment under in-
dividual health coverage is the individual's ability to assess his or her 
own probability of making a claim. Those insureds who feel a greater 
degree of impairment, as measured by their own personal index, are 
thought to remain with a coverage plan, while those who feel little or 
no impairment will shop around for cheaper coverage or more extensive 
coverage for the same price (Bluhm, 1982). Under this model of per-
sonal optimization, claims experience deteriorates over and above any 
attenuation in the selection effect as the block of business matures and 
over any effect due to aging of the individuals covered. Many feel that 
accepting this model entails setting up a premium reserving system in 
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an effort to be equitable to the insureds. With no premium reserve, the 
model predicts increases in the net premium in excess of the increased 
costs due to aging and selection effects. 
The fact that benefit selection can result in increased costs to the 
insurer is well identified in the literature. l Choice is also often present 
among those seeking coverage through an HMO or other managed care 
provider, whether they are seeking coverage as indiViduals, under a 
group arrangement by a large employer, or as a postretirement bene-
ficiaries. Levels of satisfaction of care received from a managed care 
provider often are determined by convenience, accessibility, and qual-
ity of care. Personal satisfaction, level of insurance protection, and ac-
cess to alternatives seem to playa primary role in decisions to change 
the type of coverage or the provider of coverage (Rossiter et al., 1989). 
Thus, individual choice may have an antiselection effect on managed 
care plans. 
Several studies have found that enrollees who are classified as sicker 
than average also have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from HMO 
coverage (Brown, 1988; Tucker and Langwell, 1989). Such a pattern ef-
fectively provides an ongoing selection process among the enrolled, re-
turning those requiring more care to FFS coverage. The principal causes 
of dis enrollment from HMO coverage identified by these researchers 
are concern about physician competency, ability to maintain continuity 
of care, and inconvenience. In studies of the elderly, those Medicare 
clients switching plans from one HMO to another are found to be in 
better health than those returning to FFS coverage. The prime motiva-
tions for switching from one HMO provider to another are convenience 
and premium rates, motivations similar to those posited for switching 
FFS coverages in Bluhm's individual coverage model. (See also Pascoe, 
1983 and Zastowny et al., 1983.) 
In 1985 the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) began a 
demonstration of SOCial/health maintenance organizations (SjHMOs).2 
The demonstration project consisted of four SjHMOs that would pro-
vide managed care for the elderly, offering both standard Medicare ben-
efits (e.g., hospital and physician) and expanded Medicare benefits such 
as drugs, hearing aids, and glasses. Three sites offered dental benefits, 
though these were reduced or eliminated by 1987 due to high use. Thus, 
for most members, SjHMOs are high option HMOs offering basic and 
expanded benefits. Unique to SjHMOs is long-term care coverage (e.g., 
1 See Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992) for illustrations and references. 
2Elderplan and SCAN Health Plan were started by long-term care providers. Seniors 
Plus (Group Health and the Ebenezer Society) and Medicare Plus-II (Northwest Kaiser-
Permanente) were high option plans in established HMOs (Newcomer et al., 1991). 
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nursing home care, homemaker care, and respite care) limited to $6,500 
to $12,000 per annum (depending on the plan) for those who meet their 
state's Medicaid criteria for nursing home care. Because of the concern 
about adverse selection, SjHMOs were required by HCFA to screen ap-
plicants for health. Enrollment was designed to limit the number of 
enrollees initially qualifying for nursing home care to 5 percent. This 
resulted in a number of nursing home care applicants being placed on a 
waiting list for subsequent enrollment. Limiting the enrollment so that 
only 5 percent of individuals enrolled qualified for nursing home care 
combined with marketing and the perceived filtering effect of a required 
health assessment produced a healthier membership (Newcomer et al., 
1990). 
Harrington et al. (1991) and Newcomer et al. (1990, 1991) examine 
client satisfaction and its effect on SjHMO disenrollment. Previous re-
search on staff and group Medicare HMOs has found that dis enrollment 
reinforces favorable enrollment bias to give the HMO an increasing ad-
vantage over FFS relative to health of the enrolled (Brown, 1988). In this 
paper we examine whether dis enrollment reinforces or counteracts the 
initial enrollment bias in the SjHMO. Samples of FFS and HMO members 
in the same locale were drawn at the beginning of the demonstration. 
All members in the SjHMO, FFS, and HMO samples were followed for 
three years. The experiences of these three samples are compared here 
to examine dis enrollment patterns associated with costs prior to, and 
health at, enrollment. 
To assess the degree to which dis enrollment patterns are functions 
of poor health or disability, we generate a measure of case mix using 
the health and disability information obtained at enrollment. Because 
this information contains many variables, we summarize health and 
disability status into six sets. The health and disability status of each 
individual are indexed by a fuzzy grade of membership score3 with 
respect to each of these six sets (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley 1994). 
3Later on we will describe how these scores can be generated from the data obtained 
at enrollment. Actuaries can apply this method, provided the same assessment infor-
mation described below is obtained for each individual enrolled. The overall pattern 
of the grade of membership scores block defines the case mix of the block. 
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2 Description of Samples Studied 
2.1 Locations 
The samples used in this paper consist of elderly (65 years and older) 
Medicare-eligible members from three different types of coverage: (i) 
S/HMO; (ii) TEFRA 4 HMO; and (iii) Medicare beneficiaries receiving care 
under FFS. The plans were in four communities: 
• Elderplan (Brooklyn, New York); 
• SCAN Health Plan (Long Beach, California); 
• SeniorPlus (Minneapolis, Minnesota); and 
• Medicare Plus-II (Portland, Oregon). 
Because the Brooklyn site initially had no TEFRA HMOs, there are 11 
different samples. The number of individuals in each sample is given 
in Table 1. The sample design covers certain age groups to ensure ad-
equate power in forming certain statistical tests. The design effect re-
sulting from this sampling has been removed in the analyses presented 
here, however, by conditioning on case mix. Because S/HMO clients 
voluntarily enrolled and were not randomly selected, individual health 
differences are statistically adjusted.5 
Two constraints to enrollment implicitly operating are competition 
from other locations and relative cost of care. Brooklyn and Portland 
were relatively new areas for HMO enrollment of the elderly, with 7 
percent and 16 percent of the elderly, respectively, enrolled in some 
HMO at the beginning of the project. Long Beach and Minneapolis were 
more established, with 24 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the 
elderly enrolled. Competition had a negative impact on the ability of 
the S/HMOs to enroll members quickly. The primary consideration in 
setting initial premium levels was to be competitive with existing HMO 
4The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) allows HMOs the option of 
providing health care to Medicare beneficiaries under a prepaid contract. In order for 
the HMO to have a population of interest to sample for comparison with S/HMO, the 
HMO had to be a operating under the prepaid (or at risk) option of TEFRA. 
5To test if case mix represents health factors affecting enrollment, we examine mor-
tality differences between FFS and S/HMO after case mix adjustment. Most differences 
are explained. Remaining differences due to unmeasured attributes (e.g., market, ac-
cess, economic and consumption variables) are controlled by using site as a variable. 
Surveys (Le., consumer chOice, plan satisfaction and dis enrollment) describe marketing 
and individual preferences (Newcomer et aI., 1990; Harrington et aI., 1991; Newcomer 
et aI., 1991). 
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Table 1 
Sample Design and Sample Sizes 
SjHMO Demonstration Project 
Type of Provider 
Location SjHMO FFS HMO 
Brooklyn 2,680 3,408 
Long Beach 1,919 3,556 1,000 
Minneapolis 1,720 2,934 1,000 
Portland 4,517 6,761 1,000 
TOTAL 10,836 16,659 3,000 
options in each of the areas. Premiums were less than those of com-
peting Medicare supplemental policies, but greater than HMO Medicare 
alternatives (Harrington and Newcomer, 1991). Despite the intent to 
keep the SjHMOs competitive, relative cost differences are present. 
SCAN Health Plan, for example, had premiums of approximately $25 
per month compared to HMO premiums of zero. Medicare Plus-II had 
higher premiums than other HMOs in Portland, but appeared to have 
little problem with enrollment or with increases in premium rates. 
2.2 Health Assessment 
To assess health and disability level, information on 31 items is ob-
tained at the time of enrollment using the health screening form (HSF) 
based on the national long-term care survey (NLTCS) screening instru-
ment (Durako, 1987). This instrument measures three areas: 
• Activities of daily living (ADLs) such as toileting, dreSSing, and 
bathing (Katz and Akpom, 1976); 
• Instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) such as preparing 
meals, laundry, housework (Lawton and Brody, 1969); and 
• Medical conditions such as diabetes, hypertension, etc. 
A brief description of these three areas is given in column 1 of Table 2. 
When applying for membership in the SjHMO, individuals were re-
quired to complete the health screening forms. This was done usually 
by mail. If some responses were inadequate, SjHMO staff followed up 
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by telephone. Consequently, health screens are available for 98.3 per-
cent of S/HMO enrollees.6 For members in FFS samples, health screen-
ing forms were done by phone. In either group, if impairments are re-
ported on two or more instrumental activities of daily living or on one 
or more activities of daily living, a detailed assessment is conducted to 
confirm impairment. The health screening form response rate is 80.5 
percent in FFS and 85.7 percent in HMOs. The response rates do not 
include 20.3 percent of the FFS and 4.5 percent of the HMO members 
in samples who were found to be institutionalized or dead (in Medicare 
files). FFS sample members not located are included in the response 
rate calculations. 
Not all variables associated with health are contained in this list 
of 31 items. To test for the adequacy of the 31 items as a measure 
of health, we examine the ability of the health scores generated from 
these 31 variables to explain mortality. Scores explain most differences 
between S/HMOs and FFS, suggesting little effect of unobserved health 
variables (Manton et al., 1994). We also examine site differences in prior 
costs, mortality, and dis enrollment between S/HMO, FFS, and HMO. Dif-
ferences not related to case mix suggest the influence of unobserved 
nonhealth variables, such as psychological, market, and economic fac-
tors. Consequently, all analyses presented here are adjusted using site, 
plan type, and living arrangement variables. 
2.3 Prior Use and Expenditures 
Medicare Part A and B data are drawn from the Medicare Automated 
Data Retrieval System (MADRS) for all plans. National file searches 
are made to locate persons spending part of the time outside a site. 
Medicare costs (for those 65 and older) in the 12 months prior to be-
ing interviewed are determined for FFS sample members (whether or 
not responding to the health screening form). For individuals who are 
members of a managed care plan, Medicare costs prior to enrollment 
are not available. These individuals are not used in any analyses involv-
ing prior costs. There are some individuals who had some prior health 
care cost data but not for the complete 12 months preceding the study. 
Generally such individuals had previous cost data covering more than 
180 days. For these individuals the data available are used to calculate 
a per diem rate which is inflated to 12 months. 
6No health assessment was made at the time the individual terminated SjHMO or 
HMO coverage. There was a satisfaction questionnaire, however administered at ter-
mination. The results of the analysis of the satisfaction data are given in Newcomer et 
al. (1991). 
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2.4 Nonresponse Bias 
Although the nonresponse rate for SjHMO enrollees on the health 
screening form is low (less than 2 percent), the nonresponse rates for 
the health screening form among the FFS sample and HMO sample range 
from 14 percent to 20 percent. Such a high nonresponse rate may bias 
measures of prior cost and function, because elderly survey nonrespon-
dents tend to be frail (e.g., Manton et al., 1991). To examine the poten-
tial bias we use average Medicare cost of the populations at each site 
and compare these with the average Medicare cost for the sample pop-
ulations. Average Medicare costs per utilizer in the site populations 
($3,449; $3,139 excluding nursing home residents) are higher than in 
FFS samples. 
We had complete Medicare utilization data for the six counties in 
the catchment area of the four SjHMOs. These data indicate that 64 
percent of eligible persons annually use Medicare-covered services. Ap-
plying this 64 percent figure to the per capita cost estimate in the site 
populations yields $2,009 per annum per eligible person or 15.2 per-
cent higher than in the samples ($1,746) reported here. The bias is in 
the direction and of the size (15 percent) found in studies of survey 
nonresponse (Manton et al., 1991; NCHS, 1964). Two year prior average 
annual costs in the National Medicare HMO Demonstration are $1,102 in 
HMOs and $1,682 in FFS (Rossiter et al., 1989). Prior costs in SjHMOs 
($1,316) are 19.4 percent higher than in those HMOs. Costs for the 
SjHMO FFS sample are only 4 percent higher than the FFS samples in 
the National Medicare HMO Demonstration. Because FFS sample costs 
are lower than for FFS site populations, the nonresponse bias in the FFS 
sample is against demonstrating favorable enrollment in SjHMOs. 
3 Heterogeneity and Case Mix 
Dahl (1991) shows that for individual health coverages the effects 
of rerating, aging of the insured, and antiselection are perfectly con-
founded without some measure of health and disability on both the 
continuing insured and those terminating coverage. By perfectly con-
founded we mean that observed increases in utilization and per capita 
cost could be generated by changes in premium, aging, or antiselec-
tion or by any combination of these in such a way that there is no way 
to quantitatively determine the sources of these increases. Because of 
such confounding, it is impossible to determine which of these sources 
is the cause of claims deterioration. Separating the effects of aging of 
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the members, function, and mortality on choice of provider type for 
managed care also requires a measure of health and disability. Such 
a measure must go beyond the standard AAPCC underwriting factors 
(i.e., age, gender, welfare and institutional status) because these predict 
less than 1 percent of the individual costs (e.g., Lubitz et al., 1985). 
The health screening form assessment provides a basis for devel-
oping such a measure. A 31 dimensional index, however, is difficult 
to implement. As noted in the recent actuarial literature (e.g., Young, 
1993), when classification risks for a collection of individuals are to be 
reduced to a few actuarially viable components, the methods of fuzzy 
sets are useful. These methods allow the reduction of highly multidi-
mensional data to a few fuzzy sets.7 Each individual is classified as 
a fuzzy member of these sets using grade of membership scores (Os-
taszewski,1993). 
A small number of meaningful sets can be determined using a quali-
tative assessment of past experience or can be generated from the data 
using computational procedures such as maximum likelihood (Manton, 
Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). In either case, the sets should represent 
a reasonable separation of risks.8 Each individual in the 11 samples is 
given a grade of membership (GoM) score indicating the degree to which 
the person is a member of each of these sets. Thus, each of these sets 
is fuzzy in that the degree to which any individual is a member of any 
set can vary between 0 (not a member) to 1 (a complete member). 
The grade of membership scores are estimated from the data con-
tained on the health screening forms. We denote the grade of member-
ship score for individual i for the kth fuzzy set as Bik with 
K 
L Bik = 1, 0:::; Bik :::; l. 
k=l 
(1) 
Let f.kj denote the probability of individual i giving a positive response 
to question j for an given that i is a complete member of set k, i.e., 
7Estimation of the fuzzy set structure resembles discrete factor analysis in that the 
statistical procedure looks for a few explanatory characteristics. (See, for example, 
Dillon and Goldstein (1984, Chapter 3) for more on factor analysis.) Usually these 
characteristics are described by a few dimensions of the data space. These characteris-
tics describe sets of individuals. Unlike factor analysis, however, the fuzzy set method 
does not require each individual to be a crisp member of these sets, but the individ-
ual may be a partial member of several sets. Note that a crisp member is a complete 
member of member of a set in the classical sense. In the classical definition of sets, an 
element is either a member of a set or not a member of the set. 
BEy reasonable separation of risks we mean that the sets need to be more than simply 
a statistical construct. They should have meaning as regards to level of health, health 
care need, utilization, mortality risk, and so forth. 
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who has (Bik = 1). The probability that i gives a positive response to 
question j is (Woodbury and Clive, 1974): 
K 
Pij = L BikAkj, 
k=l 
where K is the number of fuzzy sets. 
(2) 
The probability, Pij, can be viewed as a binomial probability for 
questionj. As shown by Suppes and Zanotti (1981), there exists a vector 
of parameters Ajkl ;:: 0 and a set of grade membership scores, Bib for 
each individual, i, such that the likelihood9 is given by: 
1 (K )YiJ1 
L = ~ ~ JJ k~l BikAjkl , (3) 
where AjkO + Ajkl = 1, YijO + Yijl = 1 and 
.. = {I if individual i gives a positive response to question j; and 
YIJI 0 otherwise. 
We choose estimates of both the BikS and the AkjlS that maximize this 
likelihood (Manton, Woodbury, and Tolley, 1994). Comparing equations 
(2) and (3) we see that Ajk = Ajkl. 
The data indicate that there are six fuzzy groups. These six groups 
are defined in the listing below. They represent different classifications 
of healthy, disabled, and frail. A regression formula for calculating 
these scores for any particular health screening form response profile 
is given in Table 3.10 
Group 1 = Healthy: Means free of medical problems and impairments, 
young (average age 71 years), often male, married, uses few ser-
vices, and has low mortality. Such persons may see little benefit 
to S/HMO long-term care benefits if premiums are high. 
9This likelihood is similar to that produced by the product binomial model. When 
there are more levels of responses than just the two considered here. the model be-
comes the product multinomial likelihood with different levels of each multinomial 
indexed by the I subscript of y. 
IOThe grade of membership for each set for an individual is obtained by adding the 
entries in the relevant columns in Table 3 for each of the 31 characteristics present 
in the individual. This will give six different totals. Negative totals are adjusted to be 
zero. The totals then are standardized to l. These standardized totals are the grade 
of membership scores for the individual. 
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Group 2 = Acutely Ill: Has multiple medical conditions (e.g., 56 per-
cent have cancer) but little impairment. It is similar in age to 
Group 1 (average age 72.2 years) and likely married and male. 
Group 2 used the most acute care in the prior year (e.g., hos-
pitalization) with mortality higher than Group 1 but lower than 
Groups 3, 4, and 6. If HMOs provide the most effective acute care, 
this group may prefer HMOs over S/HMOs. The phrase acutely ill 
emphasizes differences between groups, i.e., some conditions in 
Group 2 persist and produce intermittent or terminal disability 
(e.g., cancer); others are severe and rapidly progress to death (or 
recovery). 
Group 3 = IADL Impaired: Has instrumental activities of daily liVing, 
mobility, and neurological impairment. The instrumental activi-
ties of daily living [money management, telephoning, medications 
(Manton and Soldo, 1985)] suggest this group is cognitively im-
paired. This group is older (average age 78.8 years), dependent, 
uses long-term care, and has high mortality. Because of its long-
term care needs, it may be retained by S/HMOs. 
Group 4 = Chronic Circulatory: Has diabetes, hypertension, atheroscle-
rosis, and stroke but no cancer or heart trouble. It is old (average 
age 81.1 years) and female with higher mortality than Group 2. 
Given high acute care needs, persons in this group may dis enroll 
from S/HMOs or HMO to FFS. 
Group 5 = Older Healthy: Is functional, but has joint problems. It is 
older than Group 1 (76.2 years) and more female. It has the second 
highest marital rate. Service use is low, and mortality is similar to 
Group 1. This group may disenroll to FFS or HMO. 
Group 6 = Frail: Has multiple co-morbidities and impairments. It uses 
the most acute and long-term care services, is old (89 years), and 
has the highest mortality. Because of its long-term care needs, it 
may be retained by S/HMOs. 
The pure type, or complete member, of any of these six fuzzy sets 
is characterized by the probabilities of responses on each of the 31 
items in the health screening form. The values of i\kjl provide a profile 
describing the attributes associated with each of the groups. These 
profiles are in Table 2. For example, 100 percent of the individuals 
completely in either fuzzy set 3 or fuzzy set 6 will need help preparing 
meals. None of the individuals completely in the other fuzzy sets will 
need help with this task. 
,.... 
00 
N 
Table 2 
Parameter Values A jkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures 
for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989 
A jkl x 100 
Freq (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
"-
Needs Help With: 0 
c 1. Preparing meals 7.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ..... 
2. Laundry 9.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ::J ~ 
3. Light housework 9.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0 
4. Grocery shopping 13.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ...... 
5. Managing money 6.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 98.9 » 1"'1 
6. Taking medicine 4.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 71.1 .-+ c 
7. Making phone calls 4.4 0.0 0.0 96.1 0.0 0.0 41.7 PJ 
..... 
8. Eating 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.9 PJ 
9. Getting in/out of chairs or bed 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
"'0 
10. Walking around inside 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 ..... PJ 
11. Driving/using public transportation 14.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1"'1 .-+ 
12. Toileting 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 1"'1 
13. Dressing 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 SO 
14. Bathing 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 < 0 
15. Uses a wheelchair 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
16. Uses a walker 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.7 N 
17. Uses a cane 11.3 0.0 0.0 48.5 87.8 0.0 68.8 -z 18. Is bedfast 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.4 0 
Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1) = Healthy; (2) = Acutely Ill; (3) = Impaired; (4) = Chronically Ill; (5) = Older N 
Healthy; and (6) = Frail. 
\.0 
\.0 
.j:>. 
Table 2 (cont.) 
Parameter Values A jkl Estimated for 31 Health and Functioning Measures 
for Four Social/Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Projects 1984-1989 
A jkl X 100 
Freq (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Medical Conditions 
19. Diabetes Mellitus 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 10.5 
20. Hypertension 37.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
21. Heart trouble 21.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.4 
22. Neurological problems 7.0 0.0 0.0 73.8 0.0 0.0 37.8 
23. Stroke 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 0.0 66.5 
24. Lung or breathing problems 13.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.6 
25. Chronic cough 6.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 
26. Cancer 4.0 0.0 56.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 
27. Hardening of the arteries 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 74.1 
28. Stomach/bowel problems 17.4 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.8 
29. Bladder problems ll.S 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.2 
30. Rheumatism or Arthritis 52.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
31. Other health problems 21.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 100.0 50.1 
Weight Prevalence 44.7 11.3 9.1 11.9 lS.9 4.1 
Notes: Freq = Population Frequency; (1) = Healthy; (2) = Acutely Ill; (3) = Impaired; (4) = Chronically Ill; (5) = Older 
Healthy; and (6) = Frail. 
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Table 3 f-' 00 
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set. ~ 
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment 
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity) 
Reg. Variable K=l K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 K=6 
Intercep 0.289692 0.298944 0.152671 0.144529 0.081982 0.032183 
Prepmeal -0.218351 0.021623 0.111356 -0.014032 -0.024097 0.123501 
Laundry -0.054227 -0.009097 0.066951 0.002101 -0.019452 0.013724 
'--
Housework -0.024242 0.004899 0.080811 -0.027868 -0.029617 -0.003983 0 c 
Grocshop -0.129651 -0.014232 0.055990 0.111429 -0.018410 -0.005125 ...., ::::> 
Manmoney -0.022644 -0.005768 0.114757 -0.060307 -0.008998 -0.017040 ~ 
TakeMeds 0.068975 -0.022808 0.048879 -0.060066 -0.030088 -0.004892 0 ....., 
Phone 0.005079 0.001174 0.076400 -0.042793 0.009573 -0.049433 » t"\ M-
Eat 0.118764 0.125928 -0.135862 -0.004571 0.030091 -0.134350 c $l.I 
Getinout 0.000304 0.001282 -0.102795 -0.005648 0.006355 0.100502 ...., $l.I 
Walkinsi -0.150372 0.046225 -0.054573 -0.016254 0.130158 0.044816 -""0 
Travel -0.128237 -0.000714 0.043889 0.130489 -0.035331 -0.010097 
...., 
$l.I 
t"\ 
Toilet 0.097242 -0.000401 -0.124278 -0.014610 -0.027394 0.069439 M-t"\ 
Dress 0.002352 -0.021699 -0.057029 -0.014573 -0.002557 0.093506 _ro 
Bathe -0.002614 -0.032714 -0.050598 0.001058 -0.030534 0.115403 < 0 
Diabetes 0.007040 -0.049095 0.006535 0.007652 0.024065 0.003803 
Hyprtent -0.098511 -0.016627 0.004660 -0.020715 0.127511 0.003682 N -
HeartTro 0.079626 -0.105630 0.000703 0.005596 0.021165 -0.001460 z 
Neurocom -0.031191 0.074705 -0.048456 -0.011831 0.035221 -0.018448 
~ 
N 
Strokshm -0.013295 0.079024 -0.050048 -0.042608 0.030193 -0.003267 -~ 
\D 
Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable \D ~ 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Regression Coefficients for Grade of Membership Scores for Each Fuzzy Set. 
Responses From the Health Screening Form Assessment 
(Values Standardized to Sum to Unity) 
Reg. Variable K=l K=2 K=3 K=4 K=5 K=6 
Lungprob 0.069886 -0.096427 0.001286 0.012580 0.011855 0.000820 
Chchough -0.021299 -0.039337 -0.002120 0.016927 0.037001 0.008828 
Cancer -0.087591 0.024720 0.001723 0.014896 0.035232 0.011020 
Circprob 0.079016 -0.063062 0.006610 -0.029049 0.012688 -0.006203 
Stombowl 0.085451 -0.097491 0.003616 0.010906 0.006414 -0.008897 
Urinprob 0.040365 -0.069146 0.006774 0.013648 0.019773 -0.011414 
Rheum 0.107036 -0.019814 0.022714 -0.024747 -0.078665 -0.006523 
Othrhlth 0.301930 0.001910 0.003473 0.000485 -0.306481 -0.001317 
Wheelcha -0.022655 0.040403 -0.050348 0.051972 0.014341 -0.033712 
Walker -0.032638 0.050688 0.006774 0.022476 0.013698 -0.061000 
Cane 0.134663 0.014294 -0.008748 -0.166583 0.014227 0.012146 
Bedfast -0.095239 0.167366 -0.060080 0.028062 0.035397 -0.075506 
Notes: Reg. Variable = Regression Variable 
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Also considering use of a cane (item 17), the percentages of individ-
uals completely in each of the six groups with this characteristic are, 
respectively, 9 percent, 9 percent, 48.5 percent, 87.8 percent, 0 percent, 
and 68.8 percent. Recall that these are theoretical individuals. There 
may be few, if any, individuals who are complete members (i.e., have 
scores of 100 percent) of any specific fuzzy set. The likelihood of a per-
son being a complete member decreases as the number of items used 
to describe persons increases. 
The grade of membership scores for each individual determine the 
degree to which the individual may be classified into each of the six 
sets. These grade of membership scores reflect the level of frailty and 
disability of each individual and are used to define a case mix. They 
also may be treated as a type of regression variable with regard to a 
response of interest. In particular, we are interested in the probability 
of changing coverage as a function of the level of disability and frailty. 
Because the Bik score for each individual is a surrogate for the probabil-
ity of changing coverage, a model for the probability of change should 
be based on these. For a complete member of the kth fuzzy set let AkT 
denote the probability of transition to another form of care during an 
interval. For individual i let PiT denote these same probabilities. Each 
individual will have different values of such probabilities as indexed 
by i because each individual will have different grade of membership 
scores, Bib to each of the fuzzy sets. We use the representation similar 
to equation (2) above with the subscript j replaced by T. Explicitly, 
K 
PiT = L BikAkT . 
k=l 
(4) 
In equation (4), AkT parameters vary according to the type of provider 
(SjHMO, HMO, or FFS) and are specific to the period of time since en-
rollment. The period of time is the three year period of the project. 
We then set up the likelihood for the dis enrollment data for the three 
year period as a competing risk model where the end of the study is the 
competing risk. Thus, individuals terminating the S/HMO and joining 
the FFS or HMO could be followed as a new entrant into one of those 
samples. We use PiT as the probability of dis enrollment. Given that 
the Bik are known (determined using the 31 health variables), the only 
unknown parameters in this model are the AkT parameters. These are 
estimated using maximum likelihood similar to equation (3) (Manton et 
al., 1994). 
Once the AkT have been estimated, the likelihood of dis enrollment 
from the S/HMO or HMO can be determined for any particular hypo-
Manton et al.: Disenrollment Patterns 187 
the tical individual for whom the 9ik are known by using equation (4). 
The probability of voluntary termination of coverage for an individual 
with 9ik scores determined from the health screening form using the 
parameters in Table 2 can be estimated by blending the estimated AkT 
values as given in equation (4). 
Naturally one can estimate other characteristics of interest such as 
utilization, cost, or mortality. In any case, the actuary can estimate the 
likely values of the characteristic of interest by determining the profile 
of 9ik scores for the block of business of interest and then using these 
scores to blend the relevant estimated AkT values. Below we will report 
the AkT values estimated for dis enrollment. 
4 Enrollment Findings 
4.1 Enrollment and Disenrollment 
Table 4 lists the average value of the 9ikS for each of the six groups at 
the beginning of the study and at the end of each of the three years. At 
baseline (year 0), Group 1 has average values of 50.2 percent for S/HMO 
members, 39.9 percent for FFS members, and 51.4 percent for HMO 
members. For the healthy fuzzy set, the S/HMOs and the HMOs attract 
similar populations. In addition, these two populations are healthier, 
in general, than the FFS population because of the greater percentages 
in Groups 1 and 5 (the healthier groups) and the lower percentages in 
Groups 2, 3, 4, and 6 (the sicker groups). The selection processes that 
either explicitly or implicitly are established with regard to S/HMO and 
HMO enrollment are functioning to enroll a healthier population. 
Over the three years the average scores for Group 1 increased 10 
to 12 percent for the three treatments. Group 5 realized a lower rate 
of increase for S/HMOs and HMOs and a slight decrease for FFS. Other 
groups decrease in prevalence with the exception of Group 2 for FFS. 
Increases in the healthy groups (Group 1 and Group 5) and decreases in 
the other groups suggest that attrition due to mortality and dis enroll-
ment is favorable for all three treatments. Hence, the S/HMOs receive 
a positive benefit from the mortality and dis enrollment patterns. Ad-
ditionally, Group 6, a target group for the S/HMOs, is less prevalent 
in S/HMOs and HMOs than in the FFS and declines faster than in the 
FFS. By the end of the third year the average scores for the S/HMO and 
the HMO have converged to approximately the same value, except for 
Group 5. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Mortality on Health Score Av~rages for S/HMOs, HMOs, 
and FFS Populations as Defined at Baseline Over Three Years for One, 
Two, and Three Year Survivors 
gk 
Group/Treatment Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 I1g 
1. Healthy 
S/HMO 50.2 51.3 52.5 56.3 +12.0% 
FFS 39.9 41.7 43.4 44.2 +10.4% 
HMO 51.4 53.0 54.1 54.6 +10.6% 
2. Acutely III 
S/HMO 9.4 9.1 9.0 9.1 - 3.1% 
FFS 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.8 +1.4% 
HMO 11.2 10.8 10.7 10.3 -7.8% 
3. IADL Impaired 
S/HMO 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.3 -11.2% 
FFS 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.3 -7.4% 
HMO 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.3 -12.1% 
4. Chronic Circulatory 
S/HMO 10.4 10.2 9.4 9.5 - 8.1% 
FFS 13.1 12.9 12.4 12.2 - 7.5% 
HMO 10.6 10.1 9.8 9.7 - 8.4% 
5. Older Healthy 
S/HMO 19.6 19.9 20.4 21.6 +10.4% 
FFS 18.8 18.7 18.4 18.3 - 2.7% 
HMO 17.5 17.8 17.7 18.0 +2.7% 
6. Frail 
S/HMO 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.1 -54.6% 
FFS 5.5 4.3 3.6 3.3 -39.1% 
HMO 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.0 -53.2% 
Note: I1g = Percentage change in average scores from year 0 to year 3. 
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4.2 Prior Cost of Care 
A surrogate proposed as an indicator of poor health or expected 
high utilization in managed care (and to a lesser extent for individual 
health care coverage) is prior utilization. We use prior Medicare costs 
for the 12 months prior to the study as a measure of this utilization and 
compare it with the mortality outcome of each of the individuals. The 
results are listed in Table 5. In year one S/HMOs have the highest per 
enrollee costs for nonsurvivors ($4,467) and the lowest for survivors 
($1,192). FFS costs are highest for survivors ($1,650), and HMOs have 
the lowest costs for nonsurvivors ($2,629). Over the three years prior 
costs for S/HMO and HMO nonsurvivors converge toward those of FFS. 
The difference in prior cost among survivors, however, is relatively con-
stant. This indicates a potentially fundamental difference in the use of 
health care facilities among those who voluntarily join a managed care 
organization and those who do not. Additionally, we see that the ability 
of prior costs to predict mortality declines over time. 
5 Disenrollment Findings 
The major purpose of this study is to examine the S/HMO and HMO 
dis enrollment patterns as a function of health status. Disenrollment 
may increase or decrease any favorable bias in S/HMO or HMO enroll-
ment. Table 6 summarizes episodes by health group. The probabilities 
of transition reported in Table 6 are estimated using equation (4). The 
first column in Table 6 describes the six groups and the types of cover-
age. The next three columns indicate the estimated probabilities that 
an individual will change coverage, e.g., "moved from an S/HMO to FFS," 
or "moved from FFS to an HMO," if the individual is a complete mem-
ber of the group. The next column gives the probability of dying for 
a complete member of the group. The last column is for the original 
HMO. An individual may be in the HMO under study and subsequently 
be discharged to another HMO (column 3). The numbers in parentheses 
in each column are the average number of days before such a transition. 
Asterisked values indicate retention rates. 
From Table 6 we see that for complete members of Group 1 in the 
S/HMO, 73.6 percent will remain in the S/HMO for the entire study 
with the mean number of days equal to 1062.8, and 8.9 percent will 
be discharged to HMO status. The average length of time remaining in 
S/HMO for those discharged to HMOs is 525.7 days. 
Table 5 
Changes in the Prior (to Study Entry) 12 Month Medicare Costs (Reimbursements) for 
Survivors and Nonsurvivors Over Three Years 
Treatment 
SjHMO 
FFS 
HMO 
Year 1 
Alive Dead 
$1,192 
N=8,334 
$1,650 
N=15,162 
$1,203 
N=2,831 
$4,467 
N=311'" 
Ratio = 3.75 
$3,298 
N= 990 
Ratio = 2.00 
$2,629 
N= 140 
Ratio = 2.19 
Note: Ratio = Dead ($) / Alive ($) 
Year 2 
Alive Dead 
$1,137 
N=7,939 
$1,591 
N=14,251 
$1,143 
N=2,728 
$3,246 
N= 706 
Ratio = 2.85 
$2,951 
N = 1901 
Ratio = 1.85 
$2,689 
N = 243 
Ratio = 2.35 
"Number of deaths with Medicare prior service use data. 
Year 3 
Alive Dead 
$1,067 $2,941 
N=7,527 N= 1,118 
Ratio = 2.76 
$1,522 $2,957 
N=13,568 N = 2610 
Ratio = 1.94 
$1,107 $2,445 
N=2,610 N= 361 
Ratio = 2.21 
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We estimate that 12.3 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are com-
plete members will move to FFS status during a three year period of 
coverage. These individuals will stay an average of 441.2 days before 
making the transfer. Last, 5.1 percent of the S/HMO enrollees who are 
complete members of Group 1 will die, with an average of 584.0 days 
from enrollment to death. The retention rates for FFS and S/HMO are 
similar for Group 1 and to a lesser extent for Group 5. For the acutely 
ill Groups 2, 3, and 6, however, the retention rates are highest for FFS. 
Additionally, there is a significant outflow of members from S/HMO to 
FFS status for these groups. The S/HMO concept is designed to serve 
(Le., to provide long-term care services) those in Group 3 and Group 
6. This outflow may be indicative of an unmet need or dissatisfaction 
among those who are likely to require the greatest health care services. 
The probabilities in Table 6 can be used to estimate the retention 
rate for any individual as follows. First the Bik scores are determined for 
the individual of interest. If the individual is enrolled in the S/HMO, the 
likelihood of changing to FFS coverage, for example, is the weighted sum 
of the probabilities of changing from S/HMO coverage to FFS as given in 
Table 6 for each of the six groups. The weights used for each of these 
probabilities are the Bik scores of the individual. The expected retention 
of a collection of insureds is determined as the average retention all 
individuals. Depending on the distribution of the Bik scores, there will 
be a larger or smaller net flow of frail individuals and a relatively larger 
or smaller retention of healthy individuals among the covered. Other 
characteristics such as the variation in the aggregate retention, length of 
stay with the insured, cost, and utilization (not given in this paper) also 
may be calculated for a collection of insureds using the set of Bik scores 
for the insureds. Thus, the Bik can be used to define characteristics of 
the collective even though the collective may not be a homogeneous 
group of individuals. 
In Table 7 we adjust dis enrollment patterns for mortality. The first 
column describes the initial groups and treatments. The next three 
columns show the coverage to which persons move. Retention is in the 
final two columns. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the risks 
of change relative to the total rate (over all groups). 
Most differences between HMO and S/HMO dis enrollment are due 
to the likelihood the HMO members change plans. In Groups 1 and 
5, HMO dis enrollees are less likely than S/HMO dis enrollees to reenter 
FFS. There is no difference in reentry to FFS by the frail. 
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Table 6 
Episode·Based Analysis of S/HMO, HMO, and FFS Populations 
Discharged To 
Starting S/HMO HMO FFS Death Ending in 
Group HMO 
Group 1: Healthy 
S/HMO 73.6" 8.9 12.3 5.1 
(625.7) (441.2) (584.0) 
FFS 1.4 20.3 73.1 " 5.1 
(389.3) (371.5) (1003.5) (521.5) 
HMO 0.5 20.3 9.7 3.5 65.7* 
(480.4) (275.0) (371.6) (469.0) (770.5) 
Group 2: Acutely III 
S/HMO 61.8" 6.9 13.6 17.0 
(1048.8) (511.5) (357.8) (575.1) 
FFS 1.4 14.8 70.0" 13.9 
(448.6) (345.1) (1030.0) (476.4) 
HMO 0.2 25.4 10.4 9.4 53.9* 
(520.3) (276.7) (346.8) (374.6) (776.5) 
Group 3: IADL Impaired 
S/HMO 54.6* 5.6 18.3 21.5 
(1047.6) (634.3) (388.2) (515.2) 
FFS 1.4 12.7 64.1" 21.8 
(364.3) (254.1) (1018.4) (467.3) 
HMO 0.5 22.2 13.4 13.7 48.7" 
(487.5) (239.2) (345.5) (398.6) (779.0) 
Group 4: Chronic Circulatory 
S/HMO 62.2* 6.4 13.2 17.7 
(1057.8) (668.3) (409.0) (539.5) 
FFS 0.6 11.9 64.3" 23.2 
(421.7) (286.4) (1035.4) (473.6) 
HMO 1.2 15.9 13.4 13.1 55.9* 
(151.6) (222.6) (456.6) (436.4) (827.7) 
Group 5: Older Healthy 
S/HMO 69.1" 11.4 14.1 5.4 
(1051.0) (535.5) (430.3) (605.9) 
FFS 0.8 19.2 63.6" 16.4 
(326.3) (279.4) (1002.9) (472.7) 
HMO 0.9 18.2 10.1 6.3 64.1 " 
(444.1) (234.7) (349.7) (465.8) (766.4) 
Group 6: Frail 
S/HMO 31.3* 0.7 14.8 53.2 
(1065.7) (428.0) (393.6) (484.1) 
FFS 0.2 5.0 41.7* 53.2 
(269.0) (237.7) (1044.8) (401.3) 
HI\10 0.8 12.1 20.0 37.3 29.2" 
(491.2) (326.5) (441.5) (308.4) (847.6) 
Total Proportion of Episodes Ending in: 
S/HMO (67.9%)* (8.5%: (13.2%) (10.2%) 
FFS (1.1%) (16.9%: (67.4%)" (14.6%) 
HMO (0.6%) (20.0%: (10.7%) (7.1%) (61.1%)" 
Manton et al.: Disenrollment Patterns 193 
Table 7 
Case Mix and Total Discharge Rates for S/HMO, HMO, and FFS 
Service Episodes Over Three Years With Mortality Eliminated 
Discharged To TDR Enders 
Starting S/HMO HMO FFS 
Group 1: 
S/HMO 9.4 l3.0 22.4 77.6% 
FFS 1.5 21.4 22.9 77.0% 
HMO 0.5 21.1 10.1 31.7 68.3% 
Group 2: 
S/HMO 8.3 16.4 24.7 74.2% 
FFS 1.6 17.2 18.8 81.2% 
HMO 0.2 27.9 11.4 39.5 59.3% 
Group 3: 
S/HMO 7.1 23.3 30.4 69.3% 
FFS 1.8 16.3 18.1 74.4% 
HMO 0.6 25.8 15.5 41.9 56.5% 
Group 4: 
S/HMO 7.8 16.0 23.8 75.9% 
FFS 0.8 15.5 16.3 83.6% 
HMO 1.4 18.3 15.4 35.1 64.3% 
Group 5: 
S/HMO 12.1 14.9 27.0 73.0% 
FFS 1.0 23.0 24.0 76.3% 
HMO 1.0 19.5 10.8 3l.3 68.8% 
Group 6: 
S/HMO 1.5 31.6 33.1 67.0% 
FFS 0.4 10.7 11.1 89.2% 
HMO l.3 19.2 31.8 52.3 46.4% 
Total 
S/HMO 9.4 14.7 24.1 75.9% 
FFS l.3 19.8 21.1 78.9% 
HMO 0.6 21.6 11.6 33.8 66.2% 
Avg. Our. 
S/HMO (1057.8) (596.1) (420.5) (551.8) 
FFS (387.5) (331.7) (10l3.1) (466.9) 
HMO (405.0) (262.0) (375.0) (421.2) (776.7) 
Notes: TDR = Total Discharge Rate; Avg. Dur. = Average Duration in Days; 
Enders = Percentage ending in the state they started in. 
Figures in parentheses indicate class speCific risk of transition relative to 
the marginal rate. 
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When considering the net change in HMO members relative to the 
FFS client pool, we see the same pattern as described above. Explicitly, 
HMOs receive a net relative increase in clients from the FFS sector for 
the healthy and acutely ill and a net relative decrease from the frail 
groups. For the chronic care cases, the experience is neutral between 
the FFS and HMO transfers. Consequently, the HMOs are recipients of 
fortuitous reverse cumulative antis election, whereas the FFS client pool 
experiences an accumulation of antiselection. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we present an analysis of dis enrollment patterns of 
elderly in two different types of managed care plans: the TEFRA HMO 
and the S/HMO, representing coverage expanded to include long-term 
care services. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
different dis enrollment patterns are observed and if differential enroll-
ment increases or decreases any enrollment bias in a managed care pop-
ulation. To adjust disenrollment for differences in frailty and disabil-
ity, we develop a case mix index based on fuzzy set theory. A formula 
based on data gathered on the health screening form survey is included 
so that individual scores can be determined for other enrolled groups. 
Comparisons of prior utilization (costs) using this case mix index in-
dicate that it captures differences in health care need as measured by 
this surrogate. 
The results indicate that the S/HMO and the HMO have favorable en-
rollment in that the case mix for both of these types of managed care 
is healthier as measured by the case mix index than the FFS sample 
observed. The differences are confirmed in the differential mortality 
patterns and the differences in prior utilization. Disenrollment works 
in favor of the managed care sectors in that those with higher levels of 
frailty have a higher likelihood of dis enrolling from managed care than 
healthy enrollees. The result of the observed disenrollment pattern is 
to give managed care a further advantage in needed care relative to the 
FFS client population. This is evidence that the cumulative antis election 
process identified by Bluhm (1982) works in reverse in HMO-FFS tran-
sitions. There is evidence, however, that healthier individuals transfer 
from one HMO to another. Thus, it indicates that as a greater portion 
of the elderly population is enrolled to receive care under a managed 
care format, the collective experience for managed care facilities will 
degenerate as a result of a decrease in the rate of discharges to FFS. 
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In addition to the financial implications of the results presented 
here, the data suggest that the major reason for dis enrollment could 
be dissatisfaction with services. Those who are frail or are in more 
need of care have the highest dis enrollment rate. Apparently, the type 
of service and care provided by a managed care facility is best for those 
who need little care or only acute care. 
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